This paper is principally concerned with the way some sophisticated critical approaches in International Relations (IR) 
Introduction
Since the time of the pre-Socratic philosophers, one of the most persistent and pervading questions in Western philosophy has been the 'problem' of the one and the many and/or identity and difference. As Richard Bernstein notes, "Western philosophy began with this 'problem': philosophers have always been concerned with understanding what underlies and pervades the multiplicity, diversity, and sheer contingency that we encounter in our everyday lives".
1 It is, then, by no means a coincidence that the main dissatisfactions with the project of European modernity, at least since Nietzsche, converged around the criticism that the dominant tendency in
Western philosophy and metaphysics has been to privilege and valorise unity, harmony, totality and, thereby, to denigrate, suppress, or marginalise multiplicity, contingency, particularity, singularity. Similarly, until the advent of Critical Theory and post-structuralist approaches in International Relations (IR) 2 , the prioritisation of sameness over difference had been scarcely recognised as such by the debates in the field, even though it implicitly permeated the underlying epistemological and ontological assumptions of the various mainstream theories that competed for exegetic primacy in the discipline. Nonetheless, although the issue of exposing the practices of exclusion and eradication of difference, against what was seen as the naturalisation of historically contingent power structures, was gradually recognised as 1 Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 58. 2 In the context of International Relations , the terms 'Critical Theory' and 'post-structuralism' are used to refer to theorists relating their work to the Frankfurt School (particularly Habermas), on the one hand, and to primarily French post-structuralist theorists (Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and Levinas), on the other. Within this essay the work of Linklater, who mainly relies on Habermas, and Shapcott, who relies on Habermas and Gadamer, is used to exemplify 'Critical Theory' and, in particular, their own critical version of dialogic cosmopolitanism; the work of Ashley and Walker, and Campbell is used to exemplify 'post-structuralism'. The term 'critical approaches' is alluding to both types of critical theorising in IR. To begin with, the analysis will build on the distinction between the relative and the absolute interpretation of otherness most prominently found in the work of two philosophers both belonging to the phenomenology tradition, Georg Hegel and Emmanuel Levinas. The main argument this paper will be putting forward is that, in responding to the 'enigma' of otherness through either a relative or an absolute understanding of alterity, the most promising critical approaches in IR theory tend to oscillate between two equally uncritical options: they either compromise the other's true alterity so she or he becomes a mirror image of the self or, in fear of some totalising reduction bordering on violence, make the difference between sameness and strangeness so inaccessible that communication becomes impossible. Put differently, the argument is that albeit driven by different aspirations -namely either to bridge the gap between identity and difference or to question the prioritisation of identity by calling for a strategic preoccupation with alterity -critical theorising in IR appears to compromise its critical edge through relapsing into either assimilationism or radical
incommensurability. Yet, it should be noted that drawing any authoritative generalisations over the capacity of critical IR theory in toto to articulate otherness persuasively is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, by presenting the limitations and contradictions of some nuanced critical approaches in IR theory in their treatment 3 See, for instance, Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positive Era', International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989), pp. 235-54.
of alterity, this paper offers not an exhaustive account but a suggestive indication of the paradoxes involved in the politics of critique when applied on the self/other problematique.
Hegel and relative otherness
In his Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations, Richard
Shapcott engages with the work of Tzvetan Todorov in an effort to unpack the patterns of interaction that emerge when the self encounters the other for the first time. 4 In Todorov's study, the two sides of the Indians and the Spanish, after the shock of the first encounter, engage in a series of different types of relationships that range from aggressive forms of interaction like enslavement, colonialism and conquest to milder ones but still within the horizon of European self-understanding like communication, love and knowledge. According to Shapcott, these terms attempt to reveal and explain what sorts of moral action are generated by the knowledge (or ignorance) of the other's alterity. Unlike Wendt 5 , who stresses the importance of the first gestures that signal the quality of the contact between Ego and Alter, Todorov points to deeply entrenched worldviews that predetermine both the gestures and the contact. This is more than obvious in Columbus' egocentric confrontation with the other. Columbus discovers the Indians, but not their alterity, since it seems that even before the initial contact he relies on a set of conceptual preconditions and practices which are a result of his previous acculturation in a late medieval Christian Either he conceives the Indians (though without using these words) as human beings altogether, having the same rights as himself; but then he sees them not only as equals but also as identical, and this behavior leads to assimilationism, the projection of his own values on the others. Or else he starts from the difference, but the latter is immediately translated into terms of superiority and inferiority (in his case, obviously, it is the Indians who are inferior) … These two elementary figures of the experience of alterity are both grounded in egocentrism, in the identification of our own values with values in general, of our I with the universe -in the conviction that the world is one. 6 Shapcott is effectively employing Todorov's study to highlight that the most likely outcome of trying to make sense of difference in our own terms before the actual engagement with alterity would be the inability to establish genuine communication with the other. Our discovery of difference is haunted by our efforts to engage with alterity in a meaningful (to us) way. In a similar vein, Inayatullah and Blaney argue that what is truly other in alterity remains beyond immediate recognition:
Equally, Connolly argues that conquest and conversion function together as premises and signs of superiority: "each supports the other in the effort to erase the threat that difference presents to the surety of self-identity". 8 What both Todorov and Connolly describe here is a pre-Hegelian state of affairs: in the process of realising its project of identification, the individual constructs its identity in relation to a series of differences which are recognised by a knowing subject as objects of knowledge and are, subsequently, converted into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.
However, as Hegel explains time and again in the Phenomenology of Spirit 9 through the enumeration of the repeated failures of the subject's endeavours -he calls them 'shapes of consciousness' -to impose his vision on the social universe, the 'big
Other' of the social substance always returns to upset the self's teleological project.
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Hegel is never tired of reminding us that the very fact of identity's constitution through differentiation contributes to its inherent instability. In fact, Hegel's renowned sections on the master-slave dialectic can actually be construed as one of the most trenchant theoretical accounts of the subject's failed process of identification. In the paragraphs which preface the Lordship and Bondage section (paras 166-177) Hegel tells us that "self consciousness is desire" and as such is "certain of itself only by superseding the other", "certain of the nothingness of this when it "destroys the independent object" in a merely 'objective' or natural manner (paras 174-175). Therefore, if the subject is to be able to integrate for herself her opposed views of herself as 'self-consciousness' (as independent, as determining for herself what counts for her) and as 'life' (as being dependent on the given structure of organic desire), she must be able to find some desire that is not simply given but is a desire that comes out of her nature as a self-conscious independent agent per se.
These requirements are met by the subject's having a desire for recognition (Annerkenung) as an independent agent by another self-conscious agent. This is what
Hegel means when he writes that self consciousness as desire "achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (para 175), and that the goal which lies ahead is "the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which … enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'" (paras 175, 177). The encounter between the two self-conscious agents is the "attempt on the part of each to impose his own subjective point of view on the other and to claim for his own subjective point of view the status of being the "true", the objective, being and what is other than being, would be the obliteration (apophasis) of all speech.
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For any engagement with the other to be even utterable within the self's horizon of understanding, the other has to undergo a significant transmutation: its absolute otherness as manifested in its unassimilated singularity is irredeemably lost at the expense of its meaningful association with the same. Or more simply put, "any relation with the Absolute makes the absolute relative". 21 It is on this point that adherents of an absolute interpretation of otherness would castigate Hegel's movement as one that is constituted under the terms of the knowing and appropriating subject and one that inevitably leads to the subsumption of the other's true alterity.
Hence, for a thinker like Levinas, the desire to understand is the centre of the problem. For Levinas' concern is to try to understand the other without using the violence of comprehension to do so. To understand the other by comprehension, the argument goes, is to reduce other to self. It is to deprive the other precisely of the very alterity by which the other is other. Even if, as in the case of Hegel, identity is constituted through differentiation and, thus is denied any reification or naturalness, alterity as such is not recognised in its own terms. The task of the next section is to examine these objections in detail. 23 Parmenides stated it in the form: 'thought and being are the same', 24 with a radicality and simplicity which dissolves difference and otherness in the identification of thought and being. This "imperialistic gesture, a gesture to conquer, master and colonise the Other", reveals the violence committed against the other's singularity or, as Levinas calls it, the other's absolute exteriority (l'autrui) that is not reducible to any reciprocal relationship with the same. 25 For Levinas, this violence reaches its apotheosis in Hegel:
Levinas and absolute otherness
The 'I' is not a being that always remains the same, but is the being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it. It is the primary identity, the primordial work of the identification … Hegelian expresses the universality of the same identifying itself in the alterity of objects thought and despite the opposition of self to self.
26
Levinas interprets Hegelian phenomenology as affirming "the return of absolute thought to itself, the identity of the identical and the non-identical in consciousness of self recognizing itself as infinite thought, 'without other'". 27 Consequently, 'alterity' has no singular metaphysical status outside what is ontologically the same apart from being a 'moment' within the same: "'all exteriority' is reduced to or returns to the immanence of a subjectivity which itself, and in itself, exteriorizes itself". 28 Levinas boldly seeks to escape this 'philosophical imperialism' of the same by opening the space for an asymmetrical and nonreciprocal relation to the other's alterity and our infinite responsibility to and for the other. The metaphysical other is an "other with an alterity that is not formal, is not the simple reverse of identity, and is not formed out of resistance to the same, but is prior to every initiative, to all imperialism of the same. It is other with an alterity constitutive of the very content of the other."
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For Levinas, we are responsible to alterity as absolute alterity, as difference that cannot be subsumed into the same, into a totalising conceptual system that comprehends and exhausts self and other. To acknowledge the otherness of the other (l'autrui), to keep it from falling back into the other of the same requires Levinas to speak of it as the 'absolute other'. The French word 'autrui' refers to the other human Ultimately, what Derrida's thought invites us to realise is that we can never escape the real practical possibility that we will fail to do justice to the alterity of the other. On a more profound level, this is a mere implication of our inability to escape metaphysics altogether:
[T]here is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language -no syntax and no lexicon -which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce no single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest. On the contrary, the most violent position would precisely be a puritan and selfrighteous commitment to total non-violence. 47 It is in this sense that Derrida's notion of undecidability should be understood to be the necessary precondition for ethics and politics. Against criticisms that take it to be the very negation of politics and the denial of responsibility, Derrida constantly reminds us that to aspire to a world devoid of the undecidable would be to wish for the demise of politics, "for it would install a new technology, even if it was a technology that began life with the markings of progressivism and radicalism". 48 It is to this Hegel-inspired Derridian point that we will return at the end of this paper to reach, hopefully, a better understanding of the self/other problematique within the purview of immanence. and other. Philosophical hermeneutics, according to Shapcott, takes it that "the capacity for cross-cultural understandings is real and accompanies the development of language itself". 64 In the philosophical hermeneutic account, "the other is understood as a linguistically constituted agent from the start and, therefore, inherently capable of understanding and conversation". 65 The crux of this approach is the denial of any determinate understanding of the other prior to actual engagement. Conversation rests on the notion that "understanding refers to the subject matter (Die Sache) of conversation, to what is said, not the sayer, the text, not the writer". Although Shapcott's approach aspires to avoid assimilationism by pointing to our historical situatedness "that always informs our understandings", 67 Shapcott himself does not deny that philosophical hermeneutics and discourse ethics hold in common the argument that "dialogue requires that agents are prepared to question their own truth claims, respect the claims of others and anticipate that all points of departure will be modified in the course of dialogue". 68 Shapcott is right to point out that philosophical hermeneutics do not share the same interest in achieving a 'thick' kind of agreement but it is rather oriented towards the much thinner goal of understanding. One, however, wonders whether even this latter goal does not previously require the affirmation of the postconventional agent. Even if philosophical hermeneutics denounces the lapsus of determining universal principles for the conversation prior to the dialogical engagement, the moment of assimilation occurs in the argument that "[r]easoned conversation is a property of all humans who possess language". 69 Shapcott is, of course, making the subtle point that the Gadamerian acount of conversation does not share the Habermasian conviction that "the capacity for thinking universally and post-traditionally…is a product of all who possesses (sic) language" 70 . In that sense, he claims, the qualities that characterise genuine dialogue cannot be confined to the 'enlightend' or 'post-conventional' individual. Shapcott insists that participants in a Gadamerian conversation are oriented towards the much more inclusive purpose of understanding rather than seeking rational agreement on 'thick' moral principles that invite exclusion or assimilation. Despite its inclusive potential, however, Shapcott's dialogic cosmopolitanism remains ambiguously torn between an understanding of language as a nonexclusionary ontological ground for conversation and the promotion of the cosmopolitan project. In fact, one is left wondering here whether the operation was successful but the patient has, unfortunately, passed away. With the absence of a normative consensus on the principles of conversation, Shapcott's account may diminish the chances of assimilation but at the expense of his cosmopolitan intentions.
Even if we accept that his model is less exclusionary than Habermas', there is no sufficient ground to accept that linguistically constituted agents will engage in revitalising cosmopolitan solidarities instead of resorting to violence and dissent. In other words, in trying to avoid the assimilatory moment altogether Shapcott allows a gap between his ontology (language) and the emancipatory content of his prescription (thin cosmopolitanism) that is never persuasively addressed. Since, then, his cosmopolitan aspirations do not necessarily follow from his ontological givens, his commitment to a non assimilatory model of conversation serves only to dissimulate the violence of his discourse. In contrast, by accepting the necessary trade-off between assimilation and cosmopolitanism through the act of presupposing agents committed to principles of rational agreement, Habermas seems to be offering a defence of the cosmopolitan project less fraught with -but, of course, not devoid ofthe pretensions of non-violence than Shapcott's non assimilative version of cosmopolitanism.
Voices of dissidence in IR: oscillating between assimilation and incommensurability
Post-structuralist theories of international relations are programmatically driven by an unconditional attentiveness to difference as well as a suspicion towards practices of unjustified exclusion. Ever since post-structuralist approaches were introduced in the discipline by Ashley's challenge to Waltz's mainstream neorealist project, 71 the critique of what was seen as the reification of historically conditioned power structures, such as anarchy and sovereignty, was associated with an almost strategic preoccupation with expanding the realm of resistance. As George and Campbell proclaimed in a special edition containing landmark articles for post-structuralist approaches in the field:
The (poststructuralist) project is a search for thinking space within the modern categories of unity, identity, and homogeneity; the search for a broader and more complex understanding of modern society which accounts for that which is left out -the other, the marginalized, the excluded. The second problem of evil is the evil that flows from the attempt to establish security of identity for any individual or group by defining the other that exposes sore spots in one's identity as evil or irrational…Is it possible to counter the second problem of evil without eliminating the functions served by identity?
75
Ashley and Walker are aware of the paradoxical status of their critique but they insist that the purpose of theorising from a 'register of freedom' can still be sustained if we construe this move as a project of 'infinite subversion' of sovereign authorities or as "theorising from the borderlines and as theorising from the void or no place".
76
Some critics have been particularly dissatisfied by international poststructuralist thought's difficulty to justify the legitimacy of its own critical discourse. In other words, by adding an abstract prescription to his critique, Campbell seems to re-enact the paradox of the politics of critique: whenever critique pretends to secure an authoritative ground it undermines its legitimacy. With all sympathy for the 'excluded', the 'victimised' and the 'disempowered', our critical reflexes against the totalising aspects of traditional morality should not be exhausted in a defence of a reversed totality, this time in the form of radical alterity. 89 Exclusion is always an exercise of power, as Carl Schmitt has persuasively shown us, but so is the exclusion of the exclusion. In thinking that they have found a point of opposition to domination by way of choosing 'deterritorialization' over 'territoriality', post-structuralists tend to become co-opted by the same logic they seek to transgress: it is by overlooking that the very point of opposition is the instrument through which domination works that the powers of domination are reinforced. Judith Butler explains this most lucidly:
"Dominance appears most effectively precisely as its 'Other'. 
Concluding Remarks
This Moving to critical international theory, despite dialogic cosmopolitanism's, emphasis on solidarity and reconciliation between universality and difference, its critical discourse remains beset by the contradictions of the Kantian critical project:
formalism's arbitrariness and the inability of reason to justify the grounds for its legislative authority. In fact, both dialogic cosmopolitan responses to pluralism and Foucauldian post-structuralist IR theory hold that the purpose of freedom is best achieved through the exercise of critique. As such they find themselves entangled in the paradoxes of the politics of critique just like Kant. This has direct ramifications on the possibilities for communication between radically different cultures, since interpreting universality as resting on procedural impartiality (discourse ethics in Linklater) or a prediscursive ontology (language as the human condition in Shapcott) or, even, construing freedom as the capacity of all human beings to exercise critique (Ashley and Walker) is already a judgement prior to the actual engagement with the other that threatens to reduce their version of universality to a defence of another exclusionary particularism.
Among post-structuralist approaches, Campbell's ethics of radical interdependence deserves a special attention since it calls for a relationship with alterity in its own terms and, thus, less predetermined by the strategic demands of the interaction. However, Campbell's ethical responsibility to the other allows limited space for the other's responsibility to the self. In parallel, it seems that the Levinasian concern for the inviolability of the other renders alterity almost inaccessible. In the final analysis, post-structuralist critique, when fixated with the purposive valorisation of heteronomy as opposed to autonomy, is always in danger of substituting one totality for another, thus becoming co-opted by the dominant Western discourse of universalism as the legitimate, politically correct and, eventually, domesticated voice of dissidence. This propensity of universality to be contaminated by the particular contexts it seeks to transcend seems to be a direct offshoot of the Derridian contention that there can be no unthematisable and non-violent ethical relation to the other outside the ontological thematisation performed irreducibly by language. Claims that fail to remain thoroughly conscious of this caveat by slipping into a certain kind of normative prescription risk compromising their critical credentials. By understanding critical normativity as total non-violence towards, or unreflective affirmation of, alterity they tend to relapse to precritical paths, i.e. either a particularistic, assimilative universalism with pretensions of true universality or radical separatism and the impossibility of communication with the other.
This latter aphorism may easily leave us with the disconcerting impression that critical theorising in IR will always be bedeviled by the failure of grounding the authority of critique. It is not the purpose of this paper to prescribe passivity exactly because it does not understand critique as a practice that can either succeed or fail.
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For this reason, it does not perceive the impossibility of theoretically overriding the self/other divide without reproducing the terms of its re-emergence as a source of discouragement; rather, it is a failure we should -in a manner similar to Heidegger's but, perhaps, less fatalistically-heroically assume provided we develop a proper understanding of the terms of this failure. This paper has not argued that the critical IR approaches examined here are not conscious of the persistency of the self/other enigma. Rather, it has attempted to show that, to the extent critical thinking in IR theory either fails to adequately address its ungroundable universalism or instantiates a puritan ideal of eliminating injustice against alterity, it winds up betraying the key element of a critical attitude towards difference. Namely, the idea that the irresolvability of the self/other conundrum is at the same time the condition of possibility for pursuing it. What is, perhaps, more important than seeking a final overcoming or dismissal of the self/other opposition is to gain the insight that it is the 91 For an elaboration of this point see Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics, pp. 189-91.
perpetual striving to preserve the tension and ambivalence between self and other that rescues both critique's authority and function.
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